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SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND THE SYMBOLIC 
POLITICS OF CORPORATION AS CONTRACT 
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie 
American corporations are structured in such a way that 
shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote 
in all significant corporate decisions.  Over the years, this 
exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an 
ongoing procession of justifications.  But as those arguments 
have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have 
circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special 
voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental 
feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of 
freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate 
constituents.  Because this set of agreements reflects the 
preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, they 
contend, it should thus be viewed as the best way to structure 
the corporation.  
The thesis of this Article is that the “nexus of contracts” 
theory is both descriptively wrong and normatively hollow, 
and, in particular, provides a poor foundation for the 
exclusive shareholder franchise. The corporation is neither a 
mere contract nor a set of contracts, literally or 
metaphorically.  Indeed, the whole notion of the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts has been a theatrical production of 
dodges, feints, and posturing designed to rationalize and 
justify the existing order of things and create the kind of 
rhetorical space corporate law scholars need to advance their 
own particular policy positions.  Once freed from the 
constraints of false theories, it is time to do the hard work of 
starting over and determining what the ideal structure or 
structures might be for organizations that bring together 
capital and labor in a process of joint production. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A corporation is a person—a legal person.  Of course, the idea of 
a corporation as an actual “person” has been roundly mocked as both 
a ridiculous fantasy and a sinister power grab.1  But constitutional 
law has long recognized that a corporation is a legal person and, as 
such, has certain legal rights and duties.2  Given the pedigree and 
notoriety of the “corporation as person” doctrine, it comes perhaps as 
some surprise that this conception is almost entirely absent in 
corporate law literature.  Instead, ever since the law and economic 
revolution of the 1980s, the reigning idea is that the corporation is a 
contract, or alternatively, a nexus of contracts.3  Either way, the 
implication is clear: corporations are nothing more than private 
agreements between parties.4 
 
 1. See, e.g., Stephen Colbert, Hobby Lobby Case, COLBERT REP. (July 14, 
2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/xivy3m/the-colbert-report-hobby-lobby-case  
[http://perma.cc/NZT6-W5KM] (“Oh, and it’s probably not a big deal, but they also 
ruled that corporations have religious beliefs.”). 
 2. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (“It 
has been settled for almost a century that corporations are persons within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Note, The Personality of the 
Corporation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 222, 223 (1906) (reviewing W. Jethro Brown, The 
Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L. QUAR. REV. 178 (Oct. 1905)) 
(“The phenomenon of corporate personality does not fit into known legal 
categories, but since it satisfies the test of personality in having capacity for legal 
rights and duties, it is most natural to treat it as though it were a person, with a 
slowly growing recognition that the analogy is more real than fictitious.”). 
 3. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (finding “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of 
a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders”); Jill 
E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 374 (2018) (noting that “scholars widely accept the utility of 
the contract metaphor” in the corporate context). 
 4. See Fisch, supra note 3, at 375 (noting modern corporate law revolves 
around the contractual approach). 
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Over the years, corporate law scholars have relied on this view to 
support many core features of modern corporate governance.  To take 
one example, corporations are structured in such a way that a single 
group of constituents—shareholders—has the right to vote for the 
governing board of directors and other significant corporate decisions.  
All other corporate constituents—most notably employees, suppliers, 
and customers—have their preferences captured through individual 
contracts rather than by casting a vote.  Although this exclusive 
shareholder franchise has been supported by several different 
arguments, prominent among them is the idea that the corporation is 
a contract.  Corporate law scholars argue that this fundamental 
feature of corporate governance, like many others, is merely the 
product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all 
corporate constituents.5  As the exclusive shareholder franchise 
reflects the preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, it 
should be viewed as the best way to structure the corporation.6 
The problem with this contention is that the corporation is 
neither a contract nor a set of contracts.  The idea is almost 
nonsensical.  Business organizations (including corporations) are 
state law entities that have their own legal personality and internal 
governance structure.  If corporations were purely creatures of 
contract, there would be no need for them under the law.  Notably, 
one of the truly salient features of corporations—limited liability—is 
not contractual in nature.  It is anti-contractual.  Moreover, reducing 
corporations to contractual components makes no theoretical sense.  
The “theory of the firm” was developed to explain why some business 
relationships were handled internally through a firm rather than 
through contractual relationships within a market.7  Delaware, the 
most popular state of incorporation, handles its corporate litigation 
through its courts of chancery; contracts, in contrast, have long been 
handled by courts of law.8 
So why do courts and commentators rely on contract theory and 
contractual metaphors when discussing corporations?  The answer is 
the symbolism of contract.  Because contracts are generally 
considered Pareto optimal at the time of their making, they are 
presumptively recognized as in the best interests of the parties and 
 
 5. See id. (noting that corporate participants are engaging in individualized 
terms to customize their corporate governance). 
 6. See id. (highlighting contractual relationships benefiting the corporation 
on “autonomy and efficiency grounds”). 
 7. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 
(1937). 
 8. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985) (observing that a major asset of the 
state of Delaware is the experience and expertise of its judiciary in the area of 
corporate law). 
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the most efficient result.9  Arguing that corporations are contracts 
therefore becomes a useful first step by creating the rhetorical space 
to advocate for a particular policy position.  The exclusive shareholder 
franchise is just such a position.  Having the nexus of contracts model 
on your side of the debate is an effective weapon against adversaries. 
What is particularly curious, then, is that this view of the 
corporation-as-contract argument has been used to support a wide 
variety of perspectives in the corporate law literature.  Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel used the nexus of contracts theory as 
a table-setter for their comprehensive law and economics approach to 
corporate law.10  In their view, because the corporation acted as a 
default contract for the parties involved, policymakers needed to 
design the “hypothetical bargain” that worked best for all parties.11  
They then offered their perspective on what tweaks to the current 
system would best benefit the participants.12  From here, however, 
the debate has split off into various camps, each using nexus of 
contracts theory to support its side.  Stephen Bainbridge argues that 
the contractual approach supports Delaware’s status quo approach, 
which favors strong managerial deference to the board of directors.13  
More fervent contractarians, however, have argued that the public 
corporation is far from the contractual ideal, and newer types of 
business entities, like limited liability companies, more closely follow 
the contractual model.14  Finally, shareholder activists have argued 
that their “contract” with corporate management should provide them 
with a more robust role in corporate governance.15 
The corporation-as-contract rhetoric is simply part of the 
symbolic corporate governance politics of the last half-century.16  
Because corporations are not contracts, or contractual 
 
 9. See Bruce R. Lyons, Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: 
Inter-Firm Contracts, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 27, 28 (1996) (assessing that 
business contracting has evolved to be an efficient response). 
 10. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989). 
 11. See id. at 1428 (noting that without a knowledge of the rights among 
participants in the economy at any given time, default rules are difficult to 
establish). 
 12. See id. at 1447 (“Each investor must live with the structure of risks built 
into the firm. . . . It is all a matter of enforcing the contracts.”). 
 13. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of 
Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 14. See e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 4 (2010). 
 15. See, e.g., NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVS., THE EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM ON CORPORATE STRATEGY 3 (2016) https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs 
/Shareholder_Engagement_Survey_Report_2016.pdf (noting a rise in 
shareholder activism bolstered by increased contractual power through proxy 
contests and board positions); DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS 
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 1 (2018) (discussing the efforts of large 
public-sector pension funds). 
 16. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2014). 
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agglomerations, it makes no theoretical sense to use that model as a 
paradigm.  But the rhetoric is used to support the continuing reign of 
shareholder primacy, which is a cornerstone shared by all of the 
“corporation as contract” proponents.  Shareholders hold the voting 
power exclusively because they have contracted for corporate control. 
That power excludes any other would-be participants. 
This Article asserts that the nexus of contracts theory is both 
descriptively wrong and normatively hollow, and, in particular, 
provides a poor foundation for the exclusive shareholder franchise.  
Part II of the Article will describe the basic structure of American 
corporations with special focus on the role of corporate voting.  It will 
then detail the rise and fall of two other arguments for the special 
status of shareholders when it comes to voting.  Part III, the heart of 
the Article, will detail and critically examine the many, sometimes 
overlapping versions of the corporation-as-contract.  No version of this 
theory, regardless of its motivation or particular features, stands up 
to even casual scrutiny, and as such does not support the exclusive 
shareholder franchise.  Part IV will explore theories of the firm and 
how they offer more nuanced and complete models for business 
organizations than the nexus of contracts theory.  None of these 
theories of the firm provides specific justification for the exclusive 
shareholder franchise as part of the firm.  In the end, this final 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise should be put out of 
its misery, opening the way to a broader discussion of corporate 
governance. 
II.  THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
American businesses conduct joint economic enterprises, 
particularly large-scale ones, as corporations.17  Although a variety of 
different business organizational forms exist, such as the 
partnership, the limited liability company (“LLC”), and the sole 
proprietorship, the corporation clearly dominates the economic 
landscape.18  The corporation (or “company”) has been described as 
“[t]he most important organization in the world . . . [as] the basis of 
the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the future of the rest 
 
 17. See Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent 
of Businesses but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (2014), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-
percent-revenues. 
 18. See id. (noting that only 5% of the organizational entities in the United 
States are corporations, but 62% of organizational tax revenues come from 
corporations). 
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of the world.”19  The United States is exemplary of the broader global 
approach.20 
Under US law, corporations are legal entities that are created 
through state corporate law.21  The process of forming a corporation 
is relatively straightforward.  Generally, the incorporating 
individuals must file a corporate charter, also known as the articles 
or certificate of incorporation.22  The articles of incorporation provide 
the firm’s basic structure, including the corporation’s name, the 
identity of the incorporators, the corporation’s business, and the total 
number of shares the corporation may issue.23  Other governance 
structure provisions are not necessary for the formation of the 
corporation but are allowed.24 
Once the corporation is established, control shifts from the 
entity’s incorporators to its board of directors.25  The board manages 
the firm and has the ability to bind the corporation.26  Shareholders 
typically select the directors at the annual shareholders meeting.27  
Directors must act in the firm’s interests through certain fiduciary 
duties, such as good faith and loyalty.28  However, they delegate the 
actual job of running the business to the officers, primarily through a 
hierarchy headed by the chief executive officer (“CEO”).29  This 
structure—shareholders select the directors, who in turn select the 
 
 19. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xv (2005); see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 
4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business growth in the United States 
since the Industrial Revolution.”). 
 20. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).  Hansmann and Kraakman stated,  
We must begin with the recognition that the law of business 
corporations had already achieved a remarkable degree of worldwide 
convergence at the end of the nineteenth century.  By that time, large-
scale business enterprise in every major commercial jurisdiction had 
come to be organized in the corporate form, and the core functional 
features of that form were essentially identical across these 
jurisdictions. 
Id. 
 21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2018). 
 22. See, e.g., id. 
 23. Id. § 102(a)(1)–(6). 
 24. E.g., id. at § 102(b)(7) (limiting the liability of directors for breaches of a 
fiduciary duty); id. at § 141(d) (staggering the board of directors). 
 25. Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & 
Brett McDonnell eds., 2012). 
 26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2). 
 27. Id. § 211(b). 
 28. Bodie, supra note 25, at 86. 
 29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be 
stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not 
inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .”). 
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officers to run the corporation—represents the foundation of 
corporate law. 
When a corporation is up and running, it encompasses the daily 
activities of a variety of different players inside and outside the main 
lines of control.  The officers choose executives, who in turn oversee 
managers and employees.  There are also outside “stakeholders” who 
have interests in the activities of the corporation: bondholders, 
suppliers, customers, even the community at large.  The interests of 
most of these constituents are captured in contracts that spell out 
their (largely) economic relationship with the corporation.30  
Employees work under contracts of employment; suppliers provide 
materials and services under supply contracts; and customers buy 
products and services under sales contracts.  All of these constituents 
are vital players in the life of a corporation.  But when it comes to 
selecting members of the board of directors, one group of constituents 
is privileged above all others.  Shareholders, and shareholders alone, 
vote in corporate elections.  So why are shareholders the only group 
granted the right to vote? 
A. Background on the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise 
The primary normative justification for shareholder voting is the 
theory of shareholder primacy.31  Shareholder primacy is the 
theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for such key concepts 
as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  Shareholder primacy 
essentially means that corporations exist to serve the interests of 
shareholders.32  Put more specifically, the theory mandates that the 
corporation be run with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.33 
Shareholder primacy could simply be viewed as a democratic 
legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder 
interests at the forefront because shareholders are the voting polity.  
But this puts the cart before the horse: after all, who made the 
shareholders the voting polity?  The choice of this group as the 
enfranchised citizenry is what needs justifying.  A variant of this 
justification is that shareholders are the corporation’s “owners” and 
thus are entitled to the ownership rights of profits and control.34  
However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its circularity: 
 
 30. Bodie, supra note 25, at 90. 
 31. Much of this Subpart recounts arguments made at greater length in 
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False 
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 472–76 (2008). 
 32. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
277 (1998) (“The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally 
operate in the interests of shareholders.”). 
 33. Id. at 278. 
 34. The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 
1970, at 32–33, 122–26. 
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who made the shareholders the “owners”?35  As corporate law 
commentators have convincingly pointed out, shareholders simply 
purchase a set of rights from the corporation.36  The right to vote is 
made part of the stock ownership “bundle,” but a stock could be 
constructed (and has at times been constructed) without the right to 
elect directors.37  Even shareholders with the right to vote do not 
possess many of the rights that traditionally accrue to property 
owners—the right to exclude, for example, or the right of possession.38  
Labeling shareholders “owners” is no more of a justification for the 
vote than is labeling them “voters.” 
Thus, shareholder voting is not the result of shareholder primacy.  
It is, instead, simply one of its reinforcing mechanisms.  Of course, as 
has been dogma since the seminal work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means, the shareholder vote in publicly-held companies has not been 
a particularly effective way of maintaining shareholder primacy.39  
Shareholder votes have generally been an empty exercise in 
rubber-stamping the slate of candidates nominated by the board.  But 
this is an oversimplification.  At the level of closely-held corporations, 
shareholder votes are a much livelier affair.  Here, shareholder 
primacy is generally effectuated directly by the shareholders 
themselves through the vote.  Even in publicly held companies, a 
majority, or even a properly situated minority shareholder, has the 
power to appoint its representatives to the board and thus control the 
corporation’s fate. 
It is primarily the power of a “controlling” interest40 that drives 
the law and economics of shareholder voting.  At a traditional publicly 
held corporation, the individual shareholder has little or no 
motivation to monitor the company or even vote in the election.41  But 
when those votes are amassed together into a controlling interest, 
they can vote out the current board, often immediately.42  The 
 
 35. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002) (“[T]he claim that shareholders 
own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”). 
 36. Id. at 1192. 
 37. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The 
One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 694 (1986) 
(discussing the practice of selling shares without the right to vote). 
 38. Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 
VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007). 
 39. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932). 
 40. A majority will have de jure control, but a minority interest may also 
have de facto control over the corporation.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Del. 1994) (finding ownership of 43.3% of shares to 
be a controlling interest). 
 41. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 474. 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2018) (allowing a majority of shareholders 
to execute any action that may be taken at a shareholders’ meeting, including 
removal of directors, through a written concurrence of those shareholders). 
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shareholders’ votes can be amassed through the mechanism of a 
tender offer—an offer by one entity to buy 50% or more of the 
company’s shares.43  The market for corporate control imposes the 
discipline necessary to effectuate the shareholder primacy norm.44  If 
the shareholders are ignored or unhappy, they can sell their shares 
to another entity that can agglomerate the shares into a majority 
holding.45  This new majority holder then can take complete control 
and attempt to make the profits that prior management had failed to 
generate.46  In this way, the market for corporate control leads to 
greater efficiency: the shareholders can sell their shares at a 
premium, and the acquirer can realize the benefits of control.47  This 
potential for market discipline keeps the board and management 
focused on the shareholders’ interests.48 
All these explanations, however, are little more than 
recapitulations of the way corporate law currently operates.  In order 
to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise, something beyond mere 
labels (“shareholders are owners”) or descriptions of the current 
mechanics of corporate law (“shareholder voting relies on the market 
for corporate control to effectuate shareholder primacy”) must justify 
the exclusive shareholder franchise.  Corporations, after all, are 
collective enterprises with a range of constituents, all of whom 
contribute to and benefit from the activities of the firm.  Shareholder 
primacy, and the exclusive shareholder franchise that comes with it, 
needs to be justified in some non-circular fashion.  There have been a 
few arguments that go beyond mere labels and investigate these 
questions.  Two of the most prominent are the argument from the 
residual and the argument from Arrow’s Theorem. 
B. The Argument from the Residual 
In their foundational work The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel attempt to ground 
shareholder primacy in standard economic theory, arguing for it in 
terms of creating the highest level of efficiency or overall social 
utility.49  They believe that maximizing shareholder wealth would 
 
 43. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the 
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 460 (2005) (detailing how voting control 
can be obtained through during hostile take overs by purchasing a majority of the 
company’s stock). 
 44. Jonathan R. Macey, Market for Corporate Control, LIBR. ECON. & 
LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html. 
 45. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 475. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 43, at 454 (discussing the importance 
of shareholder votes in the takeover setting). 
 49. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991).  Many of the arguments in the book were first 
made in an earlier article: Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in 
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generate the highest amount of surplus, and thus would result in the 
greatest overall social utility.50  Instead of justifying wealth 
maximization by labeling shareholders as the “owners” of the 
corporation, nexus of contracts theory treats shareholders as just one 
set among many contractual partners.51  Nevertheless, shareholders 
are unique as the sole “residual claimants” because their returns are 
not payable until the other contractual participants—creditors, 
employees, customers, suppliers—have been fully satisfied.52  
This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigid 
contractual entitlements, and that shareholders are not paid until all 
other claimants receive their appropriate contractual entitlements.  
As such, all participants in the corporate nexus benefit from the 
maximization of the residual.  As Easterbrook and Fischel write: 
As residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate 
incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. . . .  Those with 
fixed claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny 
benefit (in increased security) from the undertakings of a new 
project.  The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains 
and incur most of the marginal costs.  They therefore have the 
right incentives to exercise discretion.53 
This allocation of the residual justifies the exclusive shareholder 
franchise: the board of directors should have its eye on the residual, 
and they know their positions are at stake if they fail to deliver for 
the shareholders.  The same theory also applies to the market for 
corporate control: the holders of residual rights should make the 
decision over whether they sell control over the corporation to an 
outside entity.  The residual provides the appropriate incentives to 
shareholders to maximize their returns while leaving the other firm 
participants to their contractual rights (and remedies).54 
A logical consequence of the residual theory of shareholder 
primacy is the notion of “one share, one vote.”55  The idea behind “one 
share, one vote” is that each individual share of stock has equal voting 
weight with all other shares.  This is done to ensure that each share’s 
 
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 408 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law].  We will refer to the book when similar 
arguments are made in both places.  Much of this subsection recounts arguments 
first made in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 473–76. 
 50. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 35–39. 
 51. Id. at 36. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 68. 
 54. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965), for a discussion of the importance of the market for 
corporate control to shareholder wealth maximization. 
 55. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 73 (“Votes follow the residual 
interest in the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an 
equal voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of management.”). 
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voting interest is equal to the share’s interest in the residual.56  
Shares with disproportionate voting power would create skewed 
incentives: those with control would have the incentive to seek gains 
outside of the residual, in ways that do not inure proportionately to 
the other owners of the residual.57  Because of these skewed 
incentives, the residual would no longer be maximized. 
The principle that all shareholders—that is, all voters in the 
corporate franchise—have equal interests in the residual is 
foundational to the idea of the exclusive shareholder franchise.  
Because maximizing the residual maximizes the return to 
shareholders while leaving all other stakeholders contractually 
satisfied, shareholder control over the corporation will improve social 
welfare by focusing on increasing the corporation’s residual profits.  
Shareholder primacy is enforced through shareholder voting and by 
the market for corporate control, which uses the shareholder vote to 
effectuate changes in management.  This connection between the 
residual and control, as calibrated by the “one share, one vote” rule, 
appears to set up the proper incentives for maximizing the residual.  
But this argument is missing one crucial link: a reason why 
shareholders should be assigned the residual in the first place.  Why 
shareholders?  After all, any of the corporation’s stakeholders could 
be assigned the residual and would theoretically then have the 
appropriate incentives. 
Easterbrook and Fischel have an answer to this question.  
Shareholders are best positioned to be assigned the residual because 
they have relatively homogeneous interests in wealth 
maximization.58  They explain that shareholders are likely to have 
“similar if not identical” interests because “the shareholders of a given 
firm at a given time are a reasonably homogenous group.”59  And they 
argue that this homogeneity is critical to the success of shareholder 
primacy.  First, it gives all shareholders an equal interest in the 
residual, and thereby an equal incentive to monitor agency costs so 
as to reduce conflicting incentives.60  Second, limiting the interests of 
 
 56. Id.; see also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model 
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945–46 (1996) (“The case for the one 
share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives 
with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on 
bad management.”). 
 57. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 851–52 (2006) 
(discussing concerns that controlling shareholders without a commensurate 
economic stake in the corporation are more likely to “tunnel” away a 
disproportionate share of firm value). 
 58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 775, 776 (2005) (noting that the notion of “one share, one vote” is based on 
“agency costs considerations”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, 
Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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the residual holders to the residual itself provides shareholders with 
the same interests and thereby the same objectives for the firm.  
Otherwise, voters will have conflicts between preferences that will 
muddy the governance waters and lead to irresolvable disputes over 
corporate policy.  Easterbrook and Fischel, along with others, have 
argued that this consistency amongst voter preferences is the key to 
the stability and prosperity of the corporate form.61 
The argument from the residual, then, largely rests on this claim 
of shareholder homogeneity.  It is what makes this discussion of the 
shareholder residual into a meaningful normative theory, rather than 
a simple restatement of positive corporate law.  While it is true that 
shareholders, under modern corporate law, have contractual 
entitlement to the residual, this does not explain why they should 
have it.  One could imagine assigning the residual to any one of the 
corporate constituents, and then giving it the voting rights as well, in 
order to maximize the residual and generate the greatest amount of 
social utility.  Capital contributors could all be contractually assigned 
a fixed rate of return, as other constituents are under the current 
structure.  (Bondholders already get something like this.)  
Easterbrook and Fischel believe that shareholders are best suited for 
this because their preferences are so alike, much more alike than 
those of other constituent groups, and certainly more than any 
combination of groups. 
This assumption of shareholder homogeneity, however, has come 
under quite a bit of pressure over the last couple of decades.  Many 
types of shareholders have interests in the firm that go beyond a 
simple desire to maximize the residual, including majority 
shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting rights, 
members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders, 
sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management 
shareholders.  The list goes on and on.62  In each case, those particular 
shareholders have interests that threaten to override their shared 
interest in the residual. 
Moreover, shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of 
shareholders with discrete competing interests.  There is also 
heterogeneity amongst otherwise similarly situated shareholders 
with respect to their definitions of wealth maximization.  
 
1103, 1121 (2002) (noting that any rule other than one share, one vote “wastefully 
increases the agency costs associated with the corporate form”). 
 61. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 69–70; see also HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 62 (1996) (“Investor-owned firms 
have the important advantage that their owners generally share a single 
well-defined objective: to maximize the net present value of the firm’s earnings.”). 
 62. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at Subparts III(A)–(G); see also Iman 
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1258–59 (2008) (discussing how activist shareholders may seek to 
advance their own interests to the exclusion or detriment of other shareholders’ 
interest). 
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Shareholders may have very different time horizons for their 
investments.63  A flash trader looking to capitalize on a minute 
change in price is different than a pension fund manager looking to 
fund the retirements of state employees.  There is also the question of 
diversification: to what extent is the shareholder seeking to maximize 
this individual stock or, instead, maximize the entire portfolio?  This 
divide has led some commentators to suggest a normative system of 
portfolio wealth maximization, rather than share wealth 
maximization.64  Correspondingly, shareholders have different risk 
preferences and may have different tastes for the corporation’s 
approach to risk based on the ratio of their holdings in the individual 
firm compared to their overall holdings.65  Finally, even if 
shareholders agree on the goal of wealth maximization and share risk 
and time horizon preferences, they still might very well disagree 
about strategic business choices the corporation makes in these 
areas.66 
This is all to say that a key assumption in the argument from the 
residual has turned out to be wrong.  Shareholder interests are 
actually quite heterogeneous.  And even if shareholders are thought 
to at least be more homogeneous than other groups (such as 
employees), or certainly more so than any combination of 
shareholders and another group, exponents of the residual argument 
have never really made the case that there’s some kind of smooth, 
inverse relationship between preference homogeneity and firm 
 
 63. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579–83 (2006) (discussing the different financial interest 
of short-term and long-term shareholders). 
 64. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate 
Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional 
Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1021, 1056 (1996) (discussing the differences between the fictional 
shareholder envisioned by corporate law and actual shareholders who are 
generally portfolio investors). 
 65. For example, a middle-class investor on the brink of retirement will have 
different risk preferences than a young hedge fund manager with billions under 
management, even if both have $25,000 worth of shares in the same company.  
The declining marginal utility of wealth also means that the performance of the 
company has less effect on the utility of the hedge fund manager, even though 
both have the same number of shares. 
 66. For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders battled over the wisdom of 
the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq.  Michael Brick & Steve Lohr, 
Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/20/business/technology-hewlett-
packard-claims-a-victory.html; see also Lauren Hirsch, P&G Says Shareholders 
Reject Peltz’s Bid for Board Seat by Slim Margin, Activist Says Vote a Dead Heat, 
CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:33 AM),  https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/10/procter-
gamble-shareholders-vote-against-adding-nelson-peltz-to-board.html (discussing 
a closely divided vote at Proctor & Gamble regarding a director proposed by 
activist shareholders who advocated for the company to streamline its structure 
and make small acquisitions of innovative brands). 
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function.  They’ve also never pointed to some tipping point—some 
non-smooth point at which the firm slips into chaos.  And they’ve long 
ignored the fact that other constituents—most prominently, workers 
with firm-specific skills—also have incomplete contracts and residual 
interests in a corporation.67 
As the argument from the residual came under greater scrutiny, 
corporate law scholars began to look around for other potential 
justifications for the exclusive shareholder franchise.  They didn’t 
have to look very far.  Easterbrook and Fischel made a second 
argument: that shareholder voting is also compelled by the teachings 
of social choice theory.68  In particular, they and other like-minded 
scholars focused on Arrow’s theorem, the crown jewel of social choice 
theory, to take issue with expanding the corporate electorate to 
include anyone besides shareholders.69 
C. The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem 
The argument from Arrow’s theorem was first made by Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in their article on corporate voting70 
and later recounted in their book on the economic structure of 
corporate law.71  Citing Kenneth Arrow’s groundbreaking work in 
social choice theory, they explain: 
The voters, and the directors they elect, must determine both 
the objectives of the firm and the general methods of achieving 
them.  It is well known, however, that when voters hold 
dissimilar preferences it is not possible to aggregate their 
preferences into a consistent system of choices.  If a firm makes 
inconsistent choices, it is likely to self-destruct.  Consistency is 
possible, however, when voters commonly hold the same 
ranking of choices (or when the rankings are at least single-
peaked).72 
Easterbrook and Fischel then argue that shareholders have relatively 
homogeneous preferences—they are all interested in profit 
 
 67. Margaret Blair has forcefully argued for the neglected importance of 
workers’ interest in the residual.  See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY  
27 (1995); Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the 
Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 67 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: 
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738–39 (2006). 
 68. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 49, at 403–
04. 
 69. Id. at 405–06. 
 70. Id. 
 71. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 69–70. 
 72. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 49, at 405 
(citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND COLLECTIVE VALUES (2d ed. 1963); 
DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958)). 
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maximization.73  The corporate franchise, therefore, should be limited 
to this class of like-minded participants.74  
So, what is Arrow’s theorem?  The theorem is the centerpiece of 
a broader enterprise known as social choice theory.75  Social choice 
theory attempts to explain how individual preferences are aggregated 
into social choices.76  It focuses upon the social choice functions—
usually some type of voting procedure—used to move from individual 
preferences to social choices.77  Arrow’s theorem holds that no social 
choice function can simultaneously satisfy four relatively 
undemanding conditions of democratic fairness (non-dictatorship, 
Pareto efficiency, universal domain, and independence from 
irrelevant alternatives) and guarantee a transitive outcome.78  A 
transitive outcome just means that, with respect to the social 
preference order: if A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A must be 
preferred to C.79  The contrary—an intransitive preference order 
where A is preferred to B, B to C, and C to A—is referred to as a voting 
cycle, and indicates that the social choice function is unable to declare 
a winner, at least one that is meaningful.80  
As applied to corporate voting, then, the argument from Arrow’s 
theorem may be described as follows.  The theorem explains that 
 
 73. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70. 
 74. Id.  This is also, Easterbrook and Fischel mention, the reason why the 
law makes little effort to require firms to pursue goals other than profit 
maximization.  Id. at 69–70. 
 75. Social choice theory, and Arrow’s theorem, have mainly come into legal 
scholarship under the guise of public choice theory.  For summaries of the 
literature, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38–39 (1991), and Saul Levmore, Foreword to MAXWELL 
L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY, at xi–
xiv (1997). 
 76. See Levmore, supra note 75, at xi–xii. 
 77. Id. at xii. 
 78. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL VALUES ch. 3 (2d 
ed. 1963) (laying out the logical foundations and conclusions for the theorem); see 
also NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19–
23 (1978) (summarizing the assumptions, conditions, and conclusions of the 
theorem); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 62–65 (1986) (providing a concise outline of a proof of the theorem).  
Some of the terminology in this section is drawn from WILLIAM H. RIKER, 
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 293–98 (1982).  For a good 
summary of the state of social choice theory and Arrow’s theorem, see 1 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, at ix (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 
2002). 
 79. See RIKER, supra note 78, at 119, 297. 
 80. See Grant M. Hayden, The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A Defense of 
the Voting Rights Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (1999) (describing intransitivity 
as a voting cycle and explaining the problems with a system displaying this 
characteristic); Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem 
for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) (defining intransitivity and 
stating that it may in essence lead to dictatorial power being exercised in a social 
choice function by way of agenda control). 
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there is no corporate voting procedure that meets the four fairness 
conditions and, at the same time, guarantees an acyclical outcome.  
Something—either one of the fairness conditions or a guaranteed 
transitive outcome—must give.  For example, adhering to the 
condition of universal domain by allowing those with preferences that 
are dissimilar in certain ways to vote in corporate elections could 
result in inconsistent corporate decision-making, which, in turn, 
would cause a corporation to, in Easterbrook and Fischel’s terms, “self 
destruct.”81  Relaxing the condition of universal domain by restricting 
the vote to a class of participants with similar individual preferences 
would avoid such an outcome.82  Shareholders, given their 
homogeneous interest in profit maximization, fit the bill.83 
This argument has been very influential in the decades since its 
initial formulation.  Henry Hansmann, for example, uses it to argue 
against allowing every group of stakeholders to have representation 
on a corporate board of directors: “because the participants are likely 
to have radically diverging interests, making everybody an owner 
threatens to increase the costs of collective decision making 
enormously.”84  Among these costs: the possibility of a voting cycle, 
which “increases as preferences among the electorate become more 
heterogeneous.”85  Similarly, Gregory Dow worries that employee 
representatives may introduce the possibility of 
“voting . . . pathologies.”86  This argument for exclusive shareholder 
franchise has even been cited by scholars like Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout, whose “team production” theory of corporate governance 
does not otherwise demand it.87  The perceived power of the argument 
from Arrow’s theorem, then, is such that a fairly wide variety of 
corporate scholars rely upon it. 
The problem, though, is that the argument from Arrow’s theorem 
was deeply flawed from the very beginning.88  Its shortcomings do not 
stem from some vulnerability in the theorem itself, but instead from 
its application to the social choice function in question—corporate 
board voting.  We note initially that the argument from Arrow’s 
 
 81. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. at 69–70. 
 84. See HANSMANN, supra note 61, at 44. 
 85. Id. at 41–42. 
 86. Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and Employment 
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 57, 
69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
 87. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 257 (1999). In their model, people who hope 
to profit from team production give up some of their rights to the corporation and, 
in return, the corporation coordinates the activities of the team members and 
allocates the resulting production in a way that minimizes shirking and rent-
seeking.  Id. at 264. 
 88. See generally Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the 
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219 (2009). 
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theorem shares a central premise with the argument from the 
residual—that shareholders have homogeneous preferences with 
respect to wealth maximization.  But, as discussed above, this 
premise has come under increasing scrutiny because shareholders 
have interests that diverge along a number of dimensions.  The 
presence of heterogeneous shareholder preferences undercuts a 
crucial assumption of the argument from Arrow’s theorem. 
Even with the assumption of shareholder homogeneity, there are 
many other reasons why Arrow’s theorem fails to provide a suitable 
foundation for restricting corporate voting to shareholders alone.  
First, shareholder agreement on the goal of wealth maximization, 
even if true, does not indicate agreement on how best to achieve that 
goal.89  Shareholders may, and often do, wildly disagree over the 
proper course of action for their corporation.  And even if shareholders 
were to agree on the direction for their corporation, they may have 
very different ideas about which directors would best effectuate it.  
Because Arrow’s theorem operates on the level of individual 
preference orders over an array of alternatives (here, director 
candidates), agreement on the general goals or methods of the 
corporation does little to ensure that a particular voting system for 
board membership will be free from Arrovian intransitivities.  It just 
operates at the wrong level.90 
Second, the argument ignores the fact that avoiding all possible 
voting cycles comes at great cost.  Remember, Arrow’s theorem 
demonstrates that no voting procedure can simultaneously fulfill the 
four conditions of democratic fairness and guarantee a transitive 
outcome, but it says nothing about which condition should be 
sacrificed.  That decision depends on an assessment of the costs 
associated with sacrificing one of the conditions of democratic fairness 
and, on the other side, the practical likelihood and costs associated 
with intransitive outcomes.  Restricting voting rights to shareholders 
because of their purported agreement with each other is a 
straightforward violation of the condition of universal domain.  That 
condition demands that a voting procedure work with every 
permutation of voter preferences over a set of alternatives.  And like 
the other fundamental requirements of democratic fairness, universal 
domain is relatively uncontroversial.  Giving up this condition—by 
restricting individual preference orders—runs counter to the 
fundamental democratic principle that people should not be ineligible 
to vote because of their preferences; it also runs counter to a 
 
 89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory 
of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 665 (1996) (discussing various explanations, such 
as investment time and tax bracket, for disagreement over how best to achieve 
the goal of wealth maximization).  If there was complete agreement, there would, 
of course, be no reason to have board elections in the first place, since we could 
just ask one of the shareholders to report the shared preference ranking. 
 90. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1230–32. 
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fundamental principle of standard economics to take people’s 
preferences as they come.  There is something deeply wrong about 
“solving” a problem of preference aggregation by deciding not to listen 
to certain people.  But, more broadly, the point here is that the case 
for sacrificing universal domain comes with tremendous costs.91 
Third, the argument from Arrow’s theorem fails to analyze the 
likelihood or cost of intransitive corporate election outcomes.  As it 
turns out, the likelihood of cyclical outcomes, even when voting is not 
limited to shareholders, is probably quite small, and the cost of such 
outcomes, when they do occur, is negligible (and certainly not likely 
to cause corporations to “self destruct”).  Empirical observations 
across a broad range of voting mechanisms have failed to discover the 
large number of intransitivities initially predicted by social choice 
theory.92  This is probably because those early predictions were based 
on the assumption that all individual preference orders were equally 
likely to occur in a preference profile—that individual preference 
orders were somehow randomly distributed.93  They are not, and 
when more real-world preferences are considered, the likelihood of 
voting cycles considerably declines.94 
Moreover, even when voting cycles do occur, there is no reason to 
think that they will lead to inconsistent firm choices.  A nascent 
intransitivity does not automatically translate into an unstable 
outcome, because there are many features to corporate (and political) 
elections that operate to produce stability.  For example, most 
corporate board voting procedures are structured to produce a winner 
regardless of the presence of lurking intransitivities.  Board elections 
generally only require the vote of a plurality to win; as long as a 
director gets one vote, in some cases, she will win if unopposed.95 
 
 91. See id. at 1232–34. 
 92. See Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An 
Extension and Clarification, 51 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986) (explaining that 
“empirical observations of a wide variety of actual collective decision-making 
processes indicate that cyclical majorities are very rare”); Bernard Grofman, 
Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a 
“Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1993) (noting that 
cycles are much harder to find than early Social Choice models have predicted). 
 93. See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution 
for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. SCI. 317, 321 (1968). 
 94. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1234–39. 
 95. Joshua R. Mourning, Note, The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing 
Shareholder Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1143, 1144 (2007).  Some shareholders have pressed corporations to change 
their voting rules so that a director must win a majority of the votes cast in order 
to win the seat.  See id. at 1143–46 (discussing this movement).  However, even 
under such a “majority-vote” regime, a director who fails to get a majority will 
stay on until a replacement is chosen or until the majority of shareholders vote 
to remove the person.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2018) (stating that 
“[e]ach director shall hold office until such director’s successor is elected and 
qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal”).  However, some 
companies have established resignation policies which require directors to resign 
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Some boards have staggered seats, in which directors have three-year 
terms, and only one-third of the directors are elected in any given 
year.96  In cases where there actually are top cycles, the candidate 
selected by the voting procedure may, indeed, be the contingent 
product of that process.  But the voting procedures themselves, and 
the “structure-induced” equilibria they produce,97 would ensure that 
the firm would not suffer for lack of directors.  In addition, even 
assuming a complete board turnover, the subsequent board members 
presumably would know the recent history of the firm’s decisions, its 
current situation, and whether it is now in the firm’s interest to 
change course.  In other words, the board members would be able to 
exercise independent judgment as to whether their original plans for 
the firm still make sense in the current situation.  (Indeed, Jeffrey 
Gordon claims that cycling at the board level is, for this and several 
other reasons, very unlikely.)98  Proponents of the argument from 
Arrow’s theorem have not connected the long series of points between 
a board election cycle and a self-destructive firm.99 
The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the present state of the 
corporate franchise is flawed at many levels.  Shareholders do not 
have homogeneous interest in profit maximization.  Even if they did, 
it would not directly translate into the kind of agreement on 
candidates necessary to avoid intransitive results in corporate 
elections.  Further, even if shareholder homogeneity did translate 
into the requisite agreement on candidates, restricting voting rights 
to shareholders involves sacrificing a fundamental condition of 
democracy in a situation where the likelihood and impact of 
intransitive results is already negligible.  This argument for 
restricting corporate voting rights to shareholders, then, is far from 
compelling. 
For several decades, these two arguments—from the residual and 
from Arrow’s theorem—provided the theoretical support for the 
exclusive shareholder franchise.  The main debates over corporate 
voting moved on to the details: What, exactly, should shareholders be 
voting on? How responsive should the electoral mechanisms be? How 
should shareholder power be balanced against board authority?  But 
as the two underlying arguments began to break down, corporate 
scholars began to rely on a final argument, one that has long been 
 
if they are not elected by the shareholders.  Mourning, supra note 95, at 1182–
85.  For criticism of majority voting as an ineffective reform, see Vincent Falcone, 
Note, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift Solution?, 
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 844, 881–82 (2007). 
 96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (allowing such a staggered 
election procedure). 
 97. See generally RIKER, supra note 78, for some background on structure-
induced equilibria. 
 98. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game 
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 372–73 (1991). 
 99. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1239–43. 
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used to justify many other aspects of corporate governance.  This is 
the argument that the corporation, and all of its governance 
structure, is merely a product or reflection of freely bargained-for 
contracts. 
III.  CORPORATION AS NEXUS OF CONTRACTS 
As discussed above, most corporations share the same 
fundamental governance characteristics.100  The firm is controlled by 
a board of directors, who in turn select the officers who run the day-
to-day business of the operation.101  This board is elected by 
shareholders.102  The shareholders share in the profits of the 
corporation through dividends and can sell their shares on the open 
market.103  This same basic structure—shareholders electing 
directors who then appoint officers—may be found in every public 
corporation.104  Why is this tripartite power dynamic so uniform 
across corporations?  Is it because corporate law requires this 
structure, or because this structure is freely chosen and therefore the 
most efficient? 
For contractarians, the answer is that corporate constituents 
freely choose the basic features of corporate governance.  The nexus 
of contracts theory, in its purest form, holds that a corporation is 
merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships.105  In 
other words, a firm is a “legal fiction”; it is not an individual and has 
no real independent existence.106  Instead of thinking of the 
corporation as an independent entity, the nexus of contracts theory 
breaks it down into its component parts.107  These parts are the 
contractual relationships between the various parties involved with 
the firm: shareholders, directors, executives, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and employees.108  Under this approach, corporate law is 
an extension of contract law and should focus on facilitating the 
interrelationships between contractual participants in the most 
efficient manner.109 
 
 100. Gordon, supra note 98, at 373–74. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The same is true of closely-held corporations, although the roles overlap 
to a great extent. 
 105. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 309 (1976). 
 106. Id. at 310–11. 
 107. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: 
A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 411 (1989) (defining the “nexus of 
contracts” approach as “the firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set 
of contracting relations among individual factors of production”). 
 108. Id. at 418. 
 109. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1444. 
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While we’ve noted before that the preferences of corporate 
constituents are captured through a mix of voting (shareholders) and 
fixed contracts (everyone else), the contractarian argument goes 
beyond this description.  It grounds this basic division (and other 
aspects of corporate governance) in the free contractual choices of 
corporate participants.  The exclusive shareholder franchise is, then, 
part and parcel of this set of contracts.  And because it is seen as part 
of an interlocking set of free choices of all of the participants, it is 
therefore the most efficient way to structure the enterprise.  To 
question the corporate governance structure is to dispute the market 
choices of those who are, presumably, in the best position to make 
them. 
The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential in 
shaping corporate law theory over the last four decades.110  But 
despite its dominance, there is still confusion over whether the theory 
is a descriptive model, a normative prescription, or some combination 
of both.111  Michael Jensen and William Meckling presented it as a 
positive theory of the corporation and its concomitant 
relationships.112  That thread was picked up in the legal literature, 
with Easterbrook and Fischel cementing the concept in place.113  But 
they too have waffled over whether the model should be seen as a 
positive description or as a normative framework—or both.114  
The nexus of contracts theory has been sufficiently successful 
that its branches have grown in several different directions off of the 
same trunk.  We start with the strong contractarians who most closely 
adhere to the idea that a corporation is and should be considered a 
 
 110. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 9 (“The dominant model of the corporation 
in legal scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) (“Critics and 
advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in 
the last decade swept the legal theory of the corporation.”); Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that 
“the nexus-of-contracts view of the modern corporation and the principal-agent 
explanation of some important aspects of the firm . . . have had profound 
implications for some of the most important issues of corporation law”). 
 111. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999) 
(“Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse the positive proposition that the 
corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the normative proposition 
that the persons who constitute a corporation should be free to make whatever 
reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the constraints of any mandatory 
legal rules.”). 
 112. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 310–11. 
 113. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006) (describing Easterbrook and 
Fischel as “the primary expositors of the contractarian theory”). 
 114. Id. at 783 (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both 
normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it 
‘almost always’ does.”). 
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contract or set of contracts.  Second, we take a look at the 
“hypothetical bargain” popularized by Easterbrook and Fischel, as 
well as managerialists who use the theory to support the board-
centered status quo of traditional Delaware law.  Finally, we explore 
the influence of “the corporate contract” on recent debates about the 
power of shareholders within the corporate structure. 
A. Strong Contractarians 
In their article Agency Costs and a Theory of the Firm, Jensen 
and Meckling set out the straightforward proposition that “most 
organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals.”115  Rather than 
seeing the firm as something different in the economic landscape, 
Jensen and Meckling sought to remove the fictional conception of 
organizational identity to expose the network of relationships 
beneath.116  They argued that:  
[I]t makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things 
which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from 
those things that are ‘outside’ of it.  There is in a very real sense 
only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) 
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, 
material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.117 
In a sense, Jensen and Meckling are correct: corporations are 
fictional legal entities without individual corporeal or spiritual 
existence.  But to claim they are merely an agglomeration of contracts 
is a legal simplification too far.  They are forced to hedge their position 
when talking about corporations, rather than “most organizations,” 
as they state:  
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which 
is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims 
on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can 
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting 
individuals.118 
Notice the framing: there are claims on assets and cash flows “which 
generally can be sold” without permission.  The passive voice elides 
the exact mechanics, but even Jensen and Meckling admit that these 
transfers take place without contractual sanction from all parties.  
Rather, the corporate structure is doing the basic work of managing 
these flows of claims and cash.  And they do not even mention basic 
 
 115. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 310 (italics omitted). 
 116. Id. at 310–11. 
 117. Id. at 311. 
 118. Id. (italics omitted). 
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aspects of the corporation such as fiduciary duties, the board’s 
managerial power, or limited liability. 
In truth, it is unfair to put too much weight on the two pages of 
Jensen and Meckling’s article that gave birth to the nexus of contract 
theory.  The article itself focuses on the agency costs between 
shareholders and managers, provides an economic model designed 
around the difference in interests between shareholders and 
managers, and interrogates the use of debt and inside equity to 
balance these interests.119  But as subsequent theorists have 
recognized, the nexus of contract theory is not a theory of the firm.120  
It is, instead, an illustrative set-up for an article that focuses on a 
theory of corporate capital distribution. 
 Despite the thinness of Jensen and Meckling’s claims, their 
literal take on the nexus of contracts approach has found adherents 
in the legal literature.  Advocating for a strong version of 
contractarianism, these commentators argue that the corporation is 
primarily contractual, and as such it represents terms that the 
parties have freely chosen amongst themselves.121  Since the 
corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary agreements, 
corporate law should eschew mandatory rules.122  Instead, the role of 
corporate law is to create default terms that line up with the standard 
terms for which the parties would bargain.  And since the terms have 
been freely chosen, we can presume they are efficient.123 
The strong descriptive claim is the nexus of contracts theory in 
its purest form.  The corporation is entirely the product of freely 
bargained-for contracts.  These contracts, not corporate law, 
determine the structure of corporate governance.  But this literal 
 
 119. Id. at 312–57. 
 120. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 
692 (1986). 
 121. But it is sometimes difficult to parse the language of the theory to 
determine what is actually being claimed.  See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 11 
(“I have come around to the view that the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a 
literal sense, albeit a very limited one.”); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership 
and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 919 (“[A]lthough it may be technically 
accurate to describe a corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely 
inadequate.”). 
 122. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 856, 860 (1997) (“The nexus of contracts model has important implications 
for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of which is the debate over 
the proper role of mandatory legal rules.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The 
Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397 
(1989) (noting that corporate law contractarians argue “that the contractual view 
of the corporation implies that the parties should be totally free to shape their 
contractual arrangements”). 
 123. A more nuanced version of this would be: having the parties choose their 
terms is the system most likely to lead to an efficient result over time, as there is 
no other system likely to result in greater efficiency. 
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version of the corporation-as-contract claim is simply incorrect.  
Corporations are not creatures of contract.  One cannot contract to 
form a corporation.124  The individuals involved must apply to a state 
for permission to create such an entity.  The fact that this permission 
is readily granted (as long as fees and taxes are paid) does not change 
the fact that permission is required.125 
Corporate contractarians chafe at the idea of permission, because 
such permission has been used in the past as justification for 
corporate regulation.126  The idea of concession theory is that 
corporations only exist thanks to a grant—a concession—by the state, 
and the state is thereby justified in extracting a quid pro quo for the 
concession.  The history of early business entities reveals that such 
entities were in fact specific grants of authority by the crown over 
industries, territories, infrastructure, or trading routes.127  Like the 
nexus of contracts theory, concession theory is both positive and 
normative: it provides a descriptive theory of corporation based on 
state creation and argues that the state should have a freer hand to 
regulate corporations because of this creative power.128  
Contractarians have been particularly vicious and dismissive in their 
rejection of concession theory.129  But the basic premise is sound: 
corporations are creatures of the state and cannot be formed purely 
through contract.  It is impossible to do so.130 
 
 124. This fact is acknowledged by contractarian theorists.  See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 10, at 1444–45 (acknowledging that statutory corporate law 
is necessary to create a corporation). 
 125. Cf. Bratton, supra note 107, at 445 (“If the corporation really ‘is’ contract, 
as the new economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state 
interference should have withered away by now. . . .  But the sovereign presence 
persists.”). 
 126. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 208 
(2004) (“This state-creation characterization effectively sets a presumption in 
favor of regulating corporations that does not apply to other business associations 
or contracts.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the 
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 893 (2000) (“The ‘concession’ theory 
of the corporation in the English-speaking world owes its lineage to two 
aggressive assertions of the sole right of government to create legal persons: 
Coke’s decision in 1615 and the Bubble Act in 1720.”). 
 128. Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 
327, 329 (2014) (looking “to ‘rehabilitate’ concession theory, which views the 
corporation as fundamentally a creature of the state and thus presumptively 
subject to broad state regulation”). 
 129. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED 
LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68–69 (2016) (“[I]t has been over half-
a-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic stripe, took 
the concession theory seriously.”); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 775 (1989) (“There 
is no longer any justification for regarding the corporation as a concession of the 
state.”). 
 130. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 11. 
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Having to acknowledge this factual reality, contractarians then 
contend that corporate law statutes are mostly default rules, not 
mandatory rules that might interfere with private bargains struck 
through contracts.  But there is one critical feature to modern 
corporate law that is not a default rule and could not be reproduced 
through contract: limited liability.  In The Rise of the Uncorporation, 
Larry Ribstein described corporate limited liability as the result of a 
grand bargain: “[t]he corporate form represents a quid pro quo: big 
firms get corporate features, and government gets an opportunity to 
regulate governance.”131  The corporate tax—characterized as “double 
taxation,” since dividends are taxed as well—was “in a sense a fee for 
incorporating.”132  In return, the corporation’s investors were 
protected by limited liability.  As Ribstein makes clear, limited 
liability is distinctly non-contractarian: “Limited liability is 
particularly important because, unlike other corporate features 
discussed above, partnerships could not easily contract for it without 
lawmakers’ cooperation as they have to include the creditors in these 
contracts.”133  Because limited liability is a feature “that parties 
cannot replicate by private contract[,] . . . whether a statutory form 
provides for limited liability therefore will dominate parties’ choice of 
form.”134  In sum, limited liability is the main reason why the 
corporation succeeded where the partnership failed.135 
Despite the factual errors endemic to the theory, the literal 
interpretation of the nexus of contracts approach does important 
rhetorical work for strong contractarians.  By divorcing the 
corporation from the state, contractarians render efforts to regulate 
the corporation as outside interference and illegitimate.136  In this 
libertarian approach to corporate law, government can then be cast 
not as the creator of the corporate form, but rather its opponent.137  If 
 
 131. Id. at 66. 
 132. Id. at 99. 
 133. Id. at 79.  Although he recognizes that there may have been 
(cumbersome) contractual methods for limiting liability for contractual 
claimants, it would have been “impossible” to secure limited liability against tort 
claimants without the government’s help.  Id.  This thinking is a departure from 
Ribstein’s earlier contentions that limited liability could somehow be rendered 
contractual.  Butler & Ribstein, supra note 129, at 775 (“Nor does state concession 
status flow from limited liability of shareholders as against involuntary creditors. 
Limited liability is merely a consequence of the shareholders’ contract, just as it 
is of participants in other arrangements, such as non-partner creditors.”). 
 134. Id. at 138.  The importance of limited liability is a theme Ribstein turns 
to over and over again in the book.  See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 5, 8, 10–11, 
25, 37, 43–44, 72, 79–85, 95–97, 99–101, 120–21, 127, 138–47, 153, 162, 164–65, 
256. 
 135. Discussing the characteristics that are specific to corporations, Ribstein 
notes that “partnerships long have been able to contract for such corporate-type 
features, with one critical exception—limited liability.”  Id. at 76. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Mahoney, supra note 127, at 874 (arguing that “the state, far from 
facilitating organizational development, often tries to thwart it”). 
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corporations are contracts, government should step back and let the 
private parties create their nexus; any effort to intervene would 
interrupt and interfere with the market process.  This applies to the 
shareholder vote as well.  Contractarians need not come up with an 
independent justification for the shareholder franchise if that 
governance structure is simply the outcome of private ordering.  
Particularly if seen as a “nexus” of contracts, the corporation’s 
exclusive shareholder voting structure can be cast as a joint and 
consensual arrangement between all of the participants in the 
corporate form.  Creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees—all 
have agreed to the shareholder franchise because none of them 
included voting rights in their contracts. 
Of course, the irony is that state corporate law has likely stifled 
efforts to expand the franchise beyond shareholders.  A truly 
free-flowing contractual approach to governance would open the door 
to a variety of corporate forms, instead of the directors-shareholders 
structure that is so ensconced in the law.  If corporations were truly 
just an agglomeration of separate deals, it’s unlikely they would all 
look the same.  But corporate law has successfully put its stamp on 
governance, particularly on the shareholder franchise.  It is one of the 
reasons that a true contractarian like Larry Ribstein seemed to give 
up on the corporate form in favor of the limited liability company. 
The range of choices that do appear within the statutory 
framework are often illusory.  For example, section 141 of Delaware 
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) states: “The business and affairs 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”138  This apparent flexibility, however, is belied by the 
actual structure of most corporations and the presence of other 
mandatory requirements.  In practice, corporate charters are 
extremely homogenous.139  The diversity that one might expect from 
a collection of firms with heterogeneous governance needs is nowhere 
apparent.140  Moreover, the apparent flexibility of corporate law on 
paper is undercut by a more complex reality.  The textual openness of 
section 141(a), for example, masks a fairly rigorous defense of 
managerial power.  Shareholders’ power to amend the corporation’s 
bylaws under section 109(b) of the DGCL takes a back seat to the 
more free-ranging power of section 141(a).141  In addition, many 
 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 139. Klausner, supra note 113, at 784, 786–91. 
 140. Id. at 784. 
 141. John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder 
Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1353 (2001) (“A bylaw 
is impermissible if its primary purpose is to prevent or interfere with the board’s 
discretion under section 141(a) to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation . . . .”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and 
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aspects of federal securities law, particularly SEC Rule 14a-8142 and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,143 assume the existence of certain 
governance mechanisms, such as the board and shareholder 
meetings, before adding additional requirements.144  Centralized 
management is “[t]he feature that best characterizes the large-firm 
nature of the corporation,” and the board of directors is “one of the 
most distinctive features of the corporate form.”145  Similarly, 
shareholder voting, transferable shares, fiduciary duties, and capital 
lock-in are other essential “governance” elements of the corporation 
that are mandatory to the form.146 
There is another, less ambitious form of contractarianism that 
acknowledges corporate law’s imposition of mandatory, 
noncontractual terms but argues that participants nonetheless 
exercise a kind of contractual freedom by choosing the corporate form 
over others.  Businesses need not choose the corporation as their 
organizational form; they can create general and limited 
partnerships, limited liability companies, and other variations.147  
But the availability of choice amongst a set of possible forms does not 
mean that the choice is contractual.  For a variety of reasons, the 
corporation is the best (or only) choice for certain types of 
businesses.148  Although the number of choices has increased, there 
are still only a handful of options.  At best, there is an argument that, 
of the existing options, the participants who do the choosing seem to 
prefer the corporate form.  This, though, doesn’t justify the most basic 
aspects of corporate governance, such as the exclusive shareholder 
franchise.  A similar argument could be made for the many businesses 
 
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 428–
44 (1998). 
 142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2018). 
 143. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 144. For example, Rule § 240.14a-8 gives shareholders the authority to 
propose actions to the board at the annual meeting, and Sarbanes-Oxley puts 
independence requirements on audit committees, which are subcommittees of the 
board.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 2003). 
 145. RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 67 (arguing that “only a corporation must 
have a board of directors that is separate from the executives and appointed 
directly by the owners”). 
 146. Id. at 68–75. 
 147. See id. at 26–27.  Another new and increasingly popular form of business 
association is the benefit corporation.  See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate 
Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 612 (2017) (“Currently, thirty states and the District of 
Columbia have passed benefit corporation statutes, and seven additional states 
have legislation pending.”). 
 148. These reasons include: the complexity of drafting LLC or LLP charters; 
tax treatment of LLCs can be more difficult for many investors to manage; the 
unavailability of tax-deferred stock swaps for LLCs; the difference in treatment 
of equity compensation for executives and employees; and differences in state tax 
treatment. 
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in Germany, with its system of codetermination, who have chosen to 
locate or remain in Germany and give workers a vote and a seat at 
the boardroom table.149 
Although sometimes the rhetoric slips,150 it is hard to find strong 
contractarians who believe that the nexus of contracts theory is the 
literal truth.151  The theory is instead used metaphorically to present 
a narrative about the operation of the firm.  Under this narrative, the 
corporation represents the contracts that the parties would have 
made had they been able to do so.  This brings us to the “hypothetical 
bargain.” 
B. Corporation as Metaphorical Contract: The Hypothetical 
Bargain 
Even if corporations are not actually a nexus of contracts, maybe 
all the participants would have agreed to the structure used within 
corporate governance in the absence of all the pesky, real-world 
transaction costs that would bog down such decisions and otherwise 
limit free choice.  The idea behind this argument is the hypothetical 
bargain.  Though invoked by many scholars, the hypothetical bargain 
has been most forcefully articulated by Easterbrook and Fischel.152  
In trying to explain the presence of corporate law in what should—to 
them—be a world of pure contract, they maintain that “corporate law 
is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in 
corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting.”153  They 
continue: 
There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing 
quorums, and so on, that almost everyone will want to adopt.  
Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these 
terms “for free” to every corporation . . . . Corporate law—and in 
 
 149. See Dieter Sadowski et al., The German Model of Corporate and Labor 
Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. & POL’Y J. 33, 36–40 (2000). 
 150. It is difficult to measure the extent to which contractarians shift their 
metaphor into the realm of literal truth.  Certainly, most contractarians will 
admit that a corporation cannot be formed through contract.  However, the theory 
is often described in shorthand as a positive description.  See, e.g., JONATHAN R. 
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT 22 (2008) (“It 
has long been recognized . . . that the corporation . . . should be viewed as a 
‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 769, 781 (2006) (“[I]t is commonplace and correct to say that the 
corporation is a nexus of contracts . . . .”). 
 151. Fred McChesney, for example, stated: “Admittedly, as a descriptive 
matter state corporation codes and other sources of law contain many mandatory 
terms that parties cannot contract around . . . . [T]o claim that contractarians 
would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or 
stupidity.”  Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate 
Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989). 
 152. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 34. 
 153. Id. 
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particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the 
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have 
bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able 
to transact costlessly in advance.154 
Thus, in situations where certain features of a corporation cannot be 
grounded in actual bargaining of any sort, they are justified as the 
product of an imagined, ex ante bargain among members of the many 
corporate constituencies.155 
The hypothetical bargain provides three rhetorical moves to 
these quasi-contractarians.  First, the theory captures much of the 
rhetorical power of the more direct nexus of contracts theory without 
the illogical commitments that the unalloyed version of the theory 
requires.156  Second, the theory allows supporters to defend current 
practices by pointing to their roots as bargains (even if only 
hypothetical ones).157  Third, it provides the intellectual support for a 
corporate law architecture that includes default and mandatory 
terms.158  Judges and legislatures are permitted to impose terms if 
the participants in the corporation would be better off, as long as the 
narrative supports a hypothetical bargain that would arrive at the 
same place. 
Because the hypothetical bargain is based on a “best guess” as to 
what the parties really want, the success of the contractarian 
argument depends on how well this guess matches reality.  
Contractarians spend at least some time trying to figure out the 
preferences of corporate constituents.  They look to actual bargains 
on certain subjects.  And they make some simplifying assumptions 
about human motivation and behavior.  The problem with these 
approaches is that the actual bargains are often limited to more minor 
features of corporate governance negotiated between a few 
constituents, and the simplifying assumptions are often off that 
mark.  In the end, the hypothetical bargains, and the imagined 
preferences they are based on, reveal much more about the desires of 
those doing the guessing than people’s actual preferences. 
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, believe that they have a 
“ready source of guidance” when it comes to making their guesses: 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See also Bainbridge, supra note 122, at 865 n.31 (explaining that 
“corporate default rules . . . [are not] entitlements but . . . our best guess as to 
what parties would rationally agree to in the absence of any pre-existing set of 
imposed terms”); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84. NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (claiming that many 
features of non-contractual corporate law were trivial because they represent 
terms that would have been in corporate charters or bylaws anyway). 
 156. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 15. 
 157. Id. (“The rhetoric of contract is a staple of political and philosophical 
debate.  Contract means voluntary and unanimous agreement among affected 
parties.  It is therefore a powerful concept.”). 
 158. Id. 
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“the deals people actually strike when they bargain over the 
subject.”159  Legislatures and courts, then, should build corporate law 
by looking at the bargains struck by private actors in similar 
situations.  This seems fine when working out some of the details.  For 
example, there are good reasons to assume that minority 
shareholders will want protections against opportunism from 
majority shareholders—ones that already exist or that assume power 
in the future.  But it’s hard to see how this works when it comes to 
the more fundamental aspects of corporate governance structure, 
such as who has voting and control rights.  There really aren’t any 
guiding bargains over these more basic aspects of governance because 
we never have a bunch of atomistic providers of capital and labor 
floating around in the æther of free contract making such deals.  The 
grand hypothetical bargain requires us to visualize all of the 
corporate constituents sitting around a table negotiating the ideal 
governance form ex ante.  But by the time most of the actual 
constituents come to the bargaining table, the basic governance 
procedures have already been selected by the founders—they’ve 
approached the state and formed a corporation.  There’s no real-world 
analog that allows us to discern much of anything about the form that 
corporation would take.  The “deals people actually strike” are of little 
use here. 
Without the guidance of real-world bargains on the basic aspects 
of corporate governance, contractarian scholars are forced to take a 
step back, consider the preferences of all constituent groups, and then 
argue from those preferences to the hypothetical bargains.  Here, the 
best Easterbrook and Fischel can do is assume that “[i]nvestors and 
other participants agree on the stakes: money.  They therefore would 
agree unanimously to whatever rule maximizes the total value of the 
firm.”160  For them, every single corporate constituent group—
shareholders, employees, creditors, and customers—agrees on the 
goal of wealth maximization.  Again, most scholars and lawmakers 
making these guesses have tended to focus more specifically on the 
preferences of shareholders.  But they’ve largely made the same 
guess—that shareholders want to maximize wealth.161  And these 
guesses, and the hypothetical bargains based on them, are used to 
justify a broad range of the features of corporate law and governance. 
Here, though, we have a guess to test against reality to see if it 
makes sense.  It doesn’t.  The guess isn’t even accurate when it comes 
to shareholder preferences.  As we saw above, there’s no reason to 
think that every shareholder has the same type of preferences—their 
preferences are much more heterogeneous than previously 
 
 159. Id. at 34. 
 160. Id. at 23. 
 161. For a critique, see Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should 
Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248 
(2017). 
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believed.162  Indeed, even shareholders who prioritize wealth 
maximization may still disagree about what, exactly, that means, the 
proper timeline, and other issues.  And when we expand our gaze to 
other participants, the guess looks even more off the mark.  
Employees, for example, care about their wages, but they also care 
about the long-term health of their companies and their jobs.  
Customers care about the cost of their products (and, all things 
considered, like them lower rather than higher), but they also care 
about the quality of the goods or services they purchase.  The 
normative force of the hypothetical bargain disappears if the bargain 
is not based on the actual preferences of corporate constituents. 
But even if Easterbrook and Fischel are right about the 
preferences of corporate constituents—even if every last one of them 
values money above all else—that alone doesn’t lend much insight 
into the hypothetical bargains they would make.  Different corporate 
constituents may want to strike deals that maximize their own 
group’s wealth, not necessarily the overall wealth of the firm.  And 
even if you could convince all constituents that the only way to make 
a deal is to agree to a system that maximizes the value of the firm, 
that alone doesn’t automatically get you a hypothetical bargain on 
any particular governance feature.  There still exists an argument 
that a particular governance structure is the right one to achieve that 
shared goal, which brings you back to the original arguments you 
were seeking to avoid.  Is a structure that gives shareholders alone 
the right to elect board members the best way to maximize the value 
of a firm?  Maybe or maybe not.  But it depends on the particulars of 
the situation, not on any actual or hypothetical agreements. 
At this point, it should be clear that the hypothetical bargain is 
an empty concept.  It’s really just an opening that allows 
contractarians to try to link various governance features, including 
the exclusive shareholder franchise, to “free choice” and all its 
normative goodness.  The bargain doesn’t do any work by itself and 
may be used to justify virtually any corporate feature.  As Jonathan 
Macey explains, “the analytical framework that the contracting 
paradigm provides for non-contractual law is not much of a constraint 
on policymakers, since virtually any decision that a judge makes can 
be justified as being consistent with the hypothetical bargain.”163  As 
a justification for the shareholder franchise, the hypothetical bargain 
ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Of course, the hypothetical bargain serves the same rhetorical 
purpose as the nexus of contract theory: it makes the existing 
arrangements seem like a voluntary agreement among the parties.  
By viewing corporate law as a mere reflection of what the parties 
would have bargained for, proponents of the hypothetical bargain can 
achieve a twofer: set corporate law as they desire but then claim that 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. MACEY, supra note 150, at 29. 
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such arrangements represent the will of the participants.  Ultimately 
the whole enterprise seems absurd.  But the rhetoric enables these 
commentators to keep their “private ordering” priors while meddling 
when the parties do not play the game as expected. 
C. The New Corporate Contract 
The metaphor and rhetoric of contract have enjoyed recent 
application in discussions surrounding the “corporate contract” 
between shareholders and the board.  Taking the idea behind the 
general nexus of contracts theory, the corporate contract approach 
views interactions between shareholders and management as 
primarily contractual in nature.  In this instance, the “corporate 
contract” analysis has been extended to the specific mechanics of 
corporate governance: corporate charters and bylaws.164  Also known 
as the articles or certificate of incorporation, the corporate charter is 
the foundational document for the corporation and sets forth the basic 
structure of its governance, such as the board of directors and the 
creation and allocation of shares.165  Bylaws govern interstitial rules 
of governance that can directly impact specific types of procedural 
actions or decisions.166  They both provide tools for these stakeholders 
to change the rules through which the corporation is governed.  
Courts and commentators have come to characterize these 
instruments of governance as the corporate contract.167  As described 
in one recent Delaware case, “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation 
constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors, 
officers, and stockholders formed within [the state’s] statutory 
framework.”168 
 
 164. Id. at 18. 
 165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2018) (describing the contents of a certificate 
of incorporation). 
 166. Id. at § 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent 
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or 
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”).  In Delaware, the 
charter is more difficult to amend, as it requires both shareholder and board 
approval.  Id. at § 242(b)(1).  Bylaws, in contrast, can be created and amended by 
the board or by shareholders.  Id. at § 109(a). 
 167. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 
2010) (describing bylaws as “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”); 
Robert Borowski, Combatting Multiforum Shareholder Litigation: A Federal 
Acceptance of Forum Selection Bylaws, 44 SW. L. REV. 149, 150 (2014) (finding 
that “bylaws are generally treated as contracts between corporations and their 
shareholders”).  See generally Verity Winship, Litigation Rights and the 
Corporate Contract, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW 
KEEPING UP? (William Savitt et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913745 (describing the corporate contract as “the 
agreement or set of agreements that articulate the terms of the relationship 
among shareholders, directors and the corporation itself”). 
 168. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 
(Del. Ch. 2013); see also id. at 955 (“In an unbroken line of decisions dating back 
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The idea of the corporate contract is generally used to justify the 
parties’ use of charter amendments or bylaws as part of the rules of 
the game.  Commentators have argued that shareholders should have 
broad rights to propose and enact bylaws as part of their “contract” 
with the corporation.169  With a flurry of activity over bylaws 
concerning proxy access, forum selection, majority voting, advance 
notice, and litigation expenses,170 parties are hotly contesting the 
degree of deference that courts must provide.  In recent cases, 
Delaware courts have upheld bylaws concerning forum selection171 
and litigation fee-shifting.172  In these decisions, the courts have 
leaned heavily on the notion that these bylaws are part of the 
corporate contract between the shareholders, the board, and the 
corporation.173  However, Delaware did find that shareholders lacked 
the authority to propose a bylaw requiring the corporation to 
reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses.174  The Supreme 
Court found that the bylaw improperly conflicted with the board’s 
broad powers to manage the corporation.175 
Once again, we find the idea of the corporation as contract being 
used as a metaphor, and not a very useful one at that.  First, charters 
and bylaws are instruments of governance.  There is no need to layer 
the additional metaphor of “contract” on top of what are clearly 
mechanisms for managing relations between the parties.  The whole 
point of having a system of governance is to create a mechanism 
beyond simple contracts that structures the relationships between 
the parties.  As Delaware recognizes, bylaws themselves are supposed 
to focus on procedural matters rather than substantive business 
matters.176  They clearly relate to governance.177  If the legitimacy of 
 
several generations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the bylaws 
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corporation and its 
stockholders.”). 
 169. D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (proposing to “empower shareholders in public 
corporations by facilitating their ability to contract” through bylaws). 
 170. See Fisch, supra note 3, for a discussion of these bylaw controversies. 
 171. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939. 
 172. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). 
 173. Id. (“But it is settled that contracting parties may agree to modify the 
American Rule and obligate the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.  
Because corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,’ a 
fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation’s validly-enacted bylaw 
would fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule.”); 
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955. 
 174. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008). 
 175. Id. at 232. 
 176. Id. at 236; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 951 (noting that “bylaws typically do 
not contain substantive mandates, but direct how the corporation, the board, and 
its stockholders may take certain action”). 
 177. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation 
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 651–52 (2008) (describing shareholder bylaw 
proposals as “an increasingly important part of battles over corporate 
W05_HAYDEN-AUTHOR CORRECTIONS  (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2018  1:14 PM 
544 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
the particular bylaw is in question, it can be justified through the 
nature of the democratic process through which it was enacted.  There 
is no need to layer the additional idea of “contract” on top of the 
system of governance.178 
Second, the rhetoric of corporate contract has been used 
inconsistently to support a variety of different approaches to 
governance.  Commentators often cite the corporate contract to 
advocate for a hands-off or laissez-faire approach to 
shareholder-proposed bylaws.179  Because the corporation allows 
shareholders to implement procedural rules in their own interests, 
corporate law should generally presume their enforceability.  
Delaware courts, however, have used the corporate contract rhetoric 
to justify board-enacted bylaws that arguably limit shareholder 
rights.  For example, in Boilermakers v. Chevron Corp.,180 the 
Chevron and FedEx boards of directors adopted forum-selection 
bylaws naming Delaware courts as the exclusive forums for 
shareholder litigation.181  Shareholders then sued to render the 
bylaws invalid.182  The Delaware Chancery Court upheld the bylaws, 
relying in part on the idea of corporate contract.183  Then-Chancellor 
Leo Strine explained: 
In an unbroken line of decisions dating back several 
generations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the bylaws 
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware 
corporation and its stockholders.  Stockholders are on notice 
that, as to those subjects that are subject of regulation by bylaw 
under 8 Del. C. § 109(b), the board itself may act unilaterally to 
adopt bylaws addressing those subjects.  Such a change by the 
board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts 
 
governance” and “a useful way for shareholders to guard against board 
opportunism without going too far in usurping board authority”); Ben Walther, 
Bylaw Governance, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 404 (2015) (stating that 
under the bylaw governance model, “shareholders may exert authority over 
corporate affairs by promulgating bylaws that circumscribe the board's exercise 
of its authority”). 
 178. At times the language in Delaware opinions seems to be referencing the 
idea of a “social contract” to justify the governance by the consent of the governed.  
See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955–56 (“Stockholders are on notice that, as to those 
subjects that are subject of regulation by bylaw under 8 Del. C. § 109(b), the board 
itself may act unilaterally to adopt bylaws addressing those subjects.  Such a 
change by the board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts 
unilaterally; rather it is the kind of change that the overarching statutory and 
contractual regime the stockholders buy into explicitly allows the board to make 
on its own.”). 
 179. Fisch, supra note 3, at 375 (“The contractual approach has become 
particularly influential in supporting deference to the participants’ agreed-upon 
governance terms on both autonomy and efficiency grounds.”). 
 180. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 181. Id. at 937. 
 182. Id. at 938. 
 183. Id. at 939. 
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unilaterally; rather it is the kind of change that the overarching 
statutory and contractual regime the stockholders buy into 
explicitly allows the board to make on its own.  In other words, 
the Chevron and FedEx stockholders have assented to a 
contractual framework established by the DGCL and the 
certificates of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that 
stockholders will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by 
their boards.  Under that clear contractual framework, the 
stockholders assent to not having to assent to board-adopted 
bylaws.  The plaintiffs’ argument that stockholders must 
approve a forum selection bylaw for it to be contractually 
binding is an interpretation that contradicts the plain terms of 
the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy 
stock in Chevron and FedEx.  Therefore, when stockholders 
have authorized a board to unilaterally adopt bylaws, it follows 
that the bylaws are not contractually invalid simply because the 
board-adopted bylaw lacks the contemporaneous assent of the 
stockholders.184 
Although acknowledging the argument “that board-adopted bylaws 
are not like other contracts because they lack the stockholders’ 
assent,” the Chancellor dismissed it as “a failure to appreciate the 
contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware 
corporations and their stockholders.”185 
It is almost a magic trick: take the shareholders’ complete lack of 
power over a forum-selection clause and turn it into a contract.186  
Delaware even seems to allow the board to overturn a bylaw that the 
shareholders have enacted to restrain the board.187  If this 
relationship is contract, it would be an illusory one.188  There are 
certainly valid normative reasons for constraining shareholder power 
and preserving board authority.189  But, cloaking such policymaking 
under the guise of corporate contract allows the court to make the 
shareholders responsible for their own disenfranchisement.  A cynic 
might even add that Delaware inconsistently deploys the contract 
metaphor to suit its own purposes.  Forum-selection bylaws that 
choose Delaware, as well as loser-pays bylaws, are justified by the 
 
 184. Id. at 955–56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 185. Id. at 956. 
 186. One is reminded of Grant Gilmore’s astonishment at Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: “The magician who could ‘objectify’ Raffles v. Wichelhaus . . . could, the 
need arising, objectify anything.”  GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 45 
(Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
 187. Fisch, supra note 3, at 389 (citing Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 
492 (Del. Ch. 1995)). 
 188. See, e.g., Salazar v. Citadel Commc’ns Corp., 2004-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 135 
N.M. 447, 90 P.3d 466 (“Under general New Mexico contract law, an agreement 
that is subject to unilateral modification or revocation is illusory and 
unenforceable . . . .  The party that reserves the right to change the agreement 
unilaterally, and at any time, has not really promised anything at all and should 
not be permitted to bind the other party.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 3, at 374. 
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corporate contract; in contrast, bylaws that require corporations to 
reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses are not.190 
Ultimately, the corporate contract between shareholders and the 
corporation is a system of governance, not a contract.  The metaphor 
of contract blurs the picture, rather than illuminating it.  Resolving 
whether shareholders or boards should have the authority to pass 
certain kinds of bylaws is a governance issue.  The answers to these 
puzzles are not to be found in the realm of offer, acceptance, 
consideration, and the parol evidence rule. 
IV.  CORPORATION AS FIRM AND THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE 
It is strange to see the amount of intellectual energy poured into 
the flawed nexus of contracts metaphor, especially when the whole 
idea of a corporation is to differentiate it from the world of contracts.  
Yes, the individual participants may contract with one another as 
part of their relationships within the corporation.  But we have the 
corporate form to distinguish the organization and its set of 
relationships from the market and from general contractual relations.  
The corporate form, and its family of other business associations, 
were created to allow for a sustained approach to joint production.191 
There is in fact a branch of economics that is devoted to exploring 
the differences between firms and market-based transactions.  This 
research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental 
question: Why do we even have firms at all?  The function of markets 
is to allocate resources based on the best information available at the 
time.192  Firms, however, operate outside of this market structure, 
standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”193  
The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are 
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific 
business organizations—partnerships, corporations, LLCs, among 
others.  Why have we created the non-market, non-contractual 
entities in the first place?  Why not just rely on markets and contracts 
for everything? 
 
 190. Cf. id. at 382–83 (noting the inconsistency). 
 191. William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way 
to analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the 
economic arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the 
terms of the related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed 
separately from the firm (distributorship, loan agreement, employment 
contracts) as a series of bargains subject to constraints and made in 
contemplation of a long-term relationship”). 
 192. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 
519, 520 (1945). 
 193. Coase, supra note 7, at 388 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF 
INDUSTRY 85 (1930)). 
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Early economists did not seek to answer this question, but rather 
relied on a placeholder to serve their modeling needs.194  The firm was 
simply a black box that took in inputs and put out outputs.195  The 
first modern effort to inquire into the nature of firms was The Nature 
of the Firm.196  In that article, Coase framed the issue in this manner: 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market.  Within a firm these market transactions are 
eliminated, and in place of the complicated market structure 
with exchange transactions is substituted the 
entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production.  It is clear 
that these are alternative methods of coordinating production.  
Yet, having regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by 
price movements, production could be carried on without any 
organization at all, well we might ask, why is there any 
organization?197 
For Coase, the answer is transaction cost economics: organizing 
production through a market creates transaction costs that a firm can 
avoid.198  Since the firm consisted of managers and workers, the heart 
of the firm was the relationship between these two groups.  It was the 
firm’s ability to manage workers outside of a market that solved 
significant pricing and contracting expenses.  As he argued, “it is the 
fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer 
and employee’” as well as the concept of the firm itself.199 
Although the field started slowly, the theory of the firm made 
significant advancements beginning in the 1970s.  Armen Alchian 
and Harold Demsetz developed a concept of team production that 
explained the firm not as a way of providing command and control but 
as a way of pooling disparate inputs into a system of cooperative 
creation.200  They defined team production as “production in which (1) 
several types of resources are used and (2) the product is not a sum of 
separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”201  Firms are able to 
coordinate production among various groups without carving the 
 
 194. See Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the 
Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 757 (2006); Edward B. Rock & Michael 
L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001). 
 195. Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 
(2005) (“The predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, 
assumes simply that the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”). 
 196. Coase, supra note 7, at 386. 
 197. Id. at 388. 
 198. Id. at 390–92. 
 199. Id. at 404. 
 200. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
 201. Id. at 779. 
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relationships into separable contracts.202  As a result, firms are used 
when the team method increases productivity, after factoring out the 
costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the various 
players.203  Under Alchian and Demsetz’s model, the primary concern 
of team production is making sure that the team members do not 
shirk their responsibilities to the team.204  The inability to measure 
individual contributions to productivity is what makes the firm useful 
in the first place, but it is also the firm’s central governance 
problem.205  As a result, an independent monitor is necessary to 
ensure that the team members all contribute appropriately and are 
rewarded appropriately.  That central monitor is the firm itself.206 
Around the same time of Alchian and Demsetz’s work, Oliver 
Williamson was continuing to develop Coase’s “transaction-costs” 
model into a robust field of research.  Williamson used the theory of 
the firm to identify the types of contractual difficulties that are likely 
to lead to firm governance rather than market solutions.207  When 
contributions and compensation are harder to value individually, the 
parties will be left with incomplete and ambiguous contracts.  And 
these contracts will be insufficient to properly allocate economic 
power within the relationship, particularly where one or both of the 
parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the 
particular firm, project, or transaction.  In order to prevent 
opportunism in the face of these contracts, some system of governance 
is necessary to deal with ex ante developments.  Firms can provide 
this governance.  By creating legal structures that allocate control 
between the parties separate and apart from their contractual rights, 
governments can assist parties in developing relationships that 
minimize transaction costs and facilitate economic growth.208 
The property-rights theory of the firm focuses more particularly 
on the assets that the parties seek to use together.  This theory, 
developed in a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and Moore, posits 
that firms serve as a repository of property rights for assets used in 
joint production.209  By owning the property outright, the firm 
prevents the tragedy of the commons210 (in which no one holds 
 
 202. Id. at 780. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 779. 
206. Id. at 794. 
 207. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 2 
(1985). 
 208. Id. at 18. 
 209. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995); 
Grossman & Hart, supra note 120, at 716; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete 
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & 
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 
1121 (1990). 
 210. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–
45 (1968). 
W05_HAYDEN-AUTHOR CORRECTIONS  (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2018  1:14 PM 
2018] CORPORATION AS CONTRACT 549 
property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem of the 
anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up among too 
many disparate actors).211  The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates 
that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most 
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise.212  
While these types of contributors are crucial to the firm’s success, they 
are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint 
enterprise moves forward in time.213  Building on the property-rights 
theory of the firm, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have proposed 
an “access” theory of power within the firm.214  This model defines a 
firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be physical or 
human) and in terms of the people who have access to these assets.”215  
The power of the individuals within and without the firm is based on 
their relative access to the assets, which Rajan and Zingales define as 
“the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”216  Examples of 
critical resources include machines, ideas, and people.  As Rajan and 
Zingales make clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the 
resource gets no new residual rights of control.  All she gets is the 
opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make 
herself valuable.”217  Combined with her right to leave the firm, access 
gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she 
controls: her specialized human capital.”218  Other research has 
focused more specifically on the role of human capital.  According to 
the knowledge-based theory of the firm,219 a firm “develops the 
knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that 
firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will influence its 
organizational structure.”220  Rather than emphasize the ownership 
 
 211. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1–22 (2008) 
(describing the gridlock effects of disparate ownership that are characteristic of 
the anticommons). 
 212. See generally Grossman & Hart, supra note 120. 
 213. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable 
yet valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who have the most to fear from 
opportunistic behavior.  Indeed, Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency 
of the transactions costs literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human 
capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these 
questions for corporate governance.”  Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human 
Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 
66 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 214. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 
Q.J. ECON. 387, 387 (1998). 
 215. Id. at 390. 
 216. Id. at 388. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal 
Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1139–40 (2007). 
 220. Id. at 1140. 
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of physical assets, which can be fungible and non-specific, the 
knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, 
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the 
firm.  Similarly, another approach known as the capability-based 
theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning 
that can be translated into joint production.221 
These theories of the firm do not lead to the inarguable conclusion 
of shareholder primacy.  In fact, Alchian and Demsetz specifically 
question the very idea of shareholder governance: 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship 
is one emanating from the division of ownership among several 
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from 
people of various anticipations is the underlying factor?  If the 
latter, why should any of them be thought of as the owners in 
whom voting rights, whatever they may signify or however 
exercisable, should reside in order to enhance efficiency?  Why 
voting rights in any of the outside, participating investors?222 
The transaction costs and property rights theories do lend themselves 
to a concern for shareholder protection.  Both identify vulnerable 
groups among those who provide inputs and attempt to create 
structures that protect them from hold up or exploitation.  But 
compelling cases could also be made for employees, suppliers, and 
customers as the parties who—in various types of situations—would 
be the most vulnerable or most in need of protection from other 
players.223 
The nexus of contracts theory is something of an “anti-theory” of 
the firm.  It explains why firms are not necessary, rather than why 
they exist.  Unlike Alchian and Demsetz’s firm—which plays a real 
role in shaping, executing, and enforcing contracts with input 
providers—the “nexus” at the center of Jensen and Meckling’s firm is 
a mere legal fiction that is “not an individual” and has no real 
independent existence.224  Jensen and Meckling’s model focuses on 
agency costs created by the upper-level managers who are tasked to 
do the bidding of principals.  Their theory defines agency costs as the 
costs associated with monitoring by the principal, bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss.225  The monitoring 
they describe looks a lot like the “control” that Coase focused on as 
 
 221. Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and 
Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004). 
 222. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 200, at 789 n.14. 
 223. See generally Blair, supra note 213; David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In 
and the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing for 
governance rights for customers, based on sunk costs and concerns over 
opportunism). 
 224. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 311. 
 225. Id. at 308. 
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the key element in defining the firm.226  But Jensen and Meckling 
turn their attention to the relationship between shareholders 
(principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship 
of employees to the firm.  Their model joins the financial structure of 
the firm with the management structure of corporate governance. 
As other commentators have pointed out, the nexus of contract 
theory is thus not really a theory of the firm at all.  Rather, it is a 
theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm—namely, the 
corporation.227  And upon close examination, it falls apart, at least as 
a theory of the firm, or as a justification for the corporation in the first 
place.  If a corporation is really no more than a nexus of contracts, 
then there should be no need for corporations or corporate law.  For if 
firms are not necessary, there is no need for the law to create and 
support them.  As has been repeatedly recognized, the nexus of 
contracts approach is not a theory of the firm because it “says nothing 
about why firms exist or what kind of activity is undertaken by a 
certain firm.”228 
Stephen Bainbridge has drawn upon the theory of the firm and 
public choice literature in creating his “director primacy” theory of the 
corporation.229  Bainbridge’s model splits the theory of the firm 
question into two components: What are the ends for which the 
 
 226. And indeed, Jensen and Meckling observe in a footnote: “As it is used in 
this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing 
the behavior of the agent.  It includes efforts on the part of the principal to 
‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation 
policies, operating rules etc.”  Id. at 308 n.9. 
 227. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1731, 
1735 (2017); Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 
BUFF. L. REV. 727, 732 (2004); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & 
Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1624 (2001); David A. 
Westbrook, Corporation Law after Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist 
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 105 n.277 (2003) (“So for Coase, in the first 
instance, the firm is anything but a nexus of contracts.  Instead the firm is a site 
where the costs of continuous contracting (forming a market) outweigh the costs 
of forming the entity.  Ironies abound in the legal academy’s appreciation of the 
great economist.”). 
 228. Meurer, supra note 227, at 731–32 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Theory 
of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991)). 
 229. Bainbridge’s theory was developed over time through a series of articles 
on the subject.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy].  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case 
for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Voting Rights]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 
(2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy in Takeovers].  He has synthesized his 
research into a book on the subject. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
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corporation exists, and what are the means of achieving those 
ends?230  For the theory of shareholder primacy, shareholders 
represent both the ends and the means of governance.231  Bainbridge 
agrees that the goal of the corporation should be shareholder wealth 
maximization.232  He believes, however, that control of the 
corporation rests not with the shareholders but rather with the board 
of directors who serves as the “Platonic guardian” of the firm.233 
Bainbridge’s theory is thus an amalgam of shareholder primacy 
and nexus of contracts theory but with important differences.  Rather 
than saying that the firm is itself a nexus of contracts, he argues that 
the firm has a nexus of its contracts, and that the board is that 
nexus.234  According to Bainbridge, the defining characteristic of a 
firm is “the existence of a central decision-maker vested with the 
power of fiat.”235  Rather than being participatory democracies, firms 
provide for hierarchies that can direct the allocation of resources 
through command.236  Bainbridge bases his theory on Coase’s 
differentiation between markets and firms, as well as the notion that 
“firms arise when it is possible to lower these sets of costs inherent to 
team production by delegating to a team member the power to direct 
how the various inputs will be utilized by the firm.”237  Drawing upon 
Arrow’s The Limits of Organization,238 Bainbridge contrasts 
consensus-based decision-making structures with authority-based 
structures, and argues that the corporation fits Arrow’s model of an 
authority-based system.239  The board of directors serves as the 
ultimate seat of authority—the central decision-maker that contracts 
with all other players and directs them within the firm. 
Bainbridge uses the theory of the firm literature to establish the 
basics of his model (as a combination of contracts and hierarchy) and 
then to defend its particular configuration of authority and purpose.  
It is arguably a continuation of Coase’s original insight regarding 
firms, further elaborated with the hypothetical bargain used in law 
and economics analyses.  Ultimately, however, Bainbridge fails to 
flesh out his theory sufficiently to justify the near absolute control he 
provides to the board.  He repeatedly relies on Arrow’s contrast 
between consensus and authority to resolve any questions of power 
 
 230. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 547–50. 
 231. Id. at 573 (“[S]hareholder primacy embraces two principles: (1) the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . and (2) the principle of ultimate 
shareholder control.”). 
 232. Id. at 563. 
 233. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 33; Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra 
note 229, at 550–51, 560 (also referring to the board as a “sui generis body”). 
 234. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 554–60. 
 235. Id. at 555. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 556 (citing to the “Coasean theory of the firm”). 
 238. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
 239. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 557–58. 
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allocation in favor of stronger authority.  This move—characterized 
by Brett McDonnell as Bainbridge’s “Arrowian moment”—is the crux 
of his model.240  But as McDonnell points out, Arrow’s description of 
the tradeoff between authority and accountability does not resolve all 
policy questions in favor of authority.241  Ultimately, Arrow’s 
dichotomy—and by extension, the director primacy model—is “not 
able to tell us whether reform in favor of somewhat more 
accountability at the expense of some, but far from total, loss in 
authority is a good idea or not.”242 
Moreover, there is nothing in Bainbridge’s theory that requires 
the exclusive shareholder franchise.  Shareholder wealth 
maximization is built into his model, but director primacy itself does 
not need shareholders to be the only members of the electorate.  If we 
take the nexus of contracts model seriously, then any of the 
contractual partners should have the right to bargain for 
participation in the election of directors.  Only by relying on the 
hypothetical bargain can the shareholder franchise be justified.  And 
as noted above, this fictional agreement fails to justify the 
shareholder franchise independently. 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout drew extensively from the theory 
of the firm literature in developing their “team production” theory of 
corporate law.243  Like nexus of contract and director primacy 
theories, the team production model views the firm as a series of 
relationships between various constituencies.244  These relationships 
result in the joint production of goods or services.  And as in director 
primacy theory, the board of directors serves as the ultimate 
authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities, mediating 
disputes, and divvying up the profits.245  Unlike Bainbridge or 
shareholder primacy theorists, however, Blair and Stout do not argue 
that shareholder wealth maximization should be the goal of the 
corporation.  Instead, the corporation consists of all stakeholders who 
are responsible for the business of the enterprise, and the directors 
owe a duty to all of these participants in the corporate enterprise.246  
According to the model, these stakeholders contribute their resources 
to the enterprise with the implicit bargain that the enterprise itself 
will fairly apportion the responsibilities and rewards.  The board is 
 
 240. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A 
Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 139, 143 (2009). 
 241. Id. at 161.  McDonnell considers various arguments for Bainbridge’s 
allocation of power but ultimately finds none of them to solve the dilemma.  See 
id. at 162–85. 
 242. Id. at 143. 
 243. Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 313. 
 244. Id. at 254 (stating that the team production approach is “consistent with 
the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach”). 
 245. Id. at 251. 
 246. Id. at 253. 
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hired by these stakeholders to serve as the apportioning body.  The 
board thus serves the stakeholders’ interests as a group, but it must 
have authority over them in order to carry out its function.247 
Blair and Stout’s team production model draws extensively on 
the theory of the firm literature.  Their analysis opens with the 
question, “Why do firms exist?”248 and discusses the principal-agent 
and property-rights approaches on its way to developing the team 
production model.249  In focusing on the lateral interactions between 
different stakeholders, Blair and Stout draw extensively upon the 
work of Alchian and Demsetz in conceptualizing the firm as a method 
for coordinating production.250  At the same time, they criticize that 
model for taking “a potentially rich story about economic gains from 
horizontal interaction among team members and, by reducing the 
team members to interchangeable parts that make no firm-specific 
investment, reformulat[ing] the team production problem as a 
vertical principal-agent problem.”251  They then move on to consider 
the works of Bengt Holmstrom,252 Jean Tirole,253 and Rajan and 
Zingales254 in developing their own “team production” model of 
corporate law.  Their model emphasizes that the team in effect hires 
the board, rather than the other way around, and that the team 
members all plan to share in the fruits of the joint production.  As 
Blair and Stout describe it, “the public corporation is not so much a 
‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific 
investments,’ in which several different groups contribute unique and 
essential resources to the corporate enterprise, and who each find it 
difficult to protect their contribution through explicit contracts.”255  
The board serves as a group of “mediating hierarchs” who manage the 
relationships of various corporate constituencies.256 
Like Bainbridge, Blair and Stout endeavor for their model to 
serve both descriptive and normative purposes.257  They argue that 
the team production model better mirrors the law’s approach to the 
corporation, as, in practice, directors are largely left alone to manage 
the affairs of the corporation.258  Unlike director primacy, however, 
the team production model requires the board to serve all 
 
 247. Id. at 280–81. 
 248. Id. at 257. 
 249. Id. at 257–61; see also id. at 261–65 (developing a “grand-design 
principal-agent model,” which represents the conventional model of the firm). 
 250. Id. at 265 (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 200). 
 251. Id. at 267. 
 252. See generally Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. 
ECON. 324 (1982). 
 253. Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in 
Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 181 (1986). 
 254. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 214. 
 255. Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 275. 
 256. Id. at 250. 
 257. Id. at 289. 
 258. Id. at 287–319. 
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stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone.  They argue that this 
is both a better description—as, in practice, boards balance concerns 
among various constituencies—and a superior normative approach.  
The team production model offers incentives for all members of the 
team to participate, and thereby “more accurately captures the 
fundamental contracting problem corporation law attempts to 
resolve.”259 
Lynn Stout has developed another approach to the corporate firm 
with coauthor Tamara Belinfanti using systems theory.260  Stout and 
Belinfanti argue that systems theory—a design and performance 
assessment methodology used in engineering, biology, computer 
science, and management science—better models the operation and 
function of business entities.  Rather than limiting the firm to one 
undifferentiated whole, systems theory recognizes that independent 
subparts interlock together to create the larger unit.  These subparts 
are distinct yet interconnected, and they operate together as a unit 
over time to serve a given function or purpose.261  Studying a system 
is thus comprised of an acknowledgement of the many subsystems 
(and subsystems of subsystems) that make up the larger whole.  A 
subsystem may have a specific sub-purpose but still be committed 
overall to the organization’s ultimate goals.  Systems theorists would 
be wary of a single metric that purported to demonstrate the success 
of the entire organization—say, for example, share price. 
Systems theory sounds a bit like a nexus of contracts; both 
involve interwoven and overlapping layers of relationships between 
various parties.  Systems theory, however, recognizes that the firm is 
not just a set of independent relationships; it is rather a set of 
independent parts or groups that work together to serve a larger 
whole.  These parts may not “naturally” come together, as does an 
agglomeration of contracts: there must be an overall structure that 
works to harmonize the subsystems.  Rather than trusting that 
individual contracts will create a private order of maximal efficiency, 
systems theory looks to understand how successful organizations 
structure themselves to achieve that success. 
Ultimately, these theories of the firm all fail to provide 
independent support for the exclusive shareholder franchise.  Coase 
supports the idea of an internal hierarchy; Alchian and Demsetz 
demonstrate the need for a central bargaining agent.  Hart and 
Moore, Rajan and Zingales, McInerney, and Gorges and Halberstam 
 
 259. Id. at 328.  See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder 
Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2071, 2115−16 (2010), for a critique of the exclusion of non-shareholder 
representatives on Blair & Stout’s board of directors. 
 260. See generally Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The 
Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2018). 
 261. Id. at 599.  The management system “holacracy” applies an analogous 
approach.  BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 
A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 158–59 (2015). 
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all puzzle through the importance of assets to the firm, and the firm’s 
role in managing these assets.  Blair and Stout and Bainbridge focus 
on the role of the board in mediating the relationships between the 
various stakeholders.  But in none of these theories is the exclusive 
shareholder franchise a critical part of what makes the corporation a 
firm, and vice versa.  Rather than justifying the shareholder 
franchise, the theory of the firm literature is at best agnostic. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
American corporations are the most powerful economic actors in 
the modern world.  They involve a coming together of labor, capital, 
and a host of other stakeholder groups to produce most of the world’s 
goods and services in ways that generate—and distribute—enormous 
amounts of wealth.  Their decision-making structures, then, are of 
crucial importance.  Most all of them share the same system of 
governance, where shareholders elect directors who appoint officers, 
and other constituents are restricted to more limited participation 
rights through contract.  This basic organizational structure, in which 
shareholders alone ultimately control firm decision-making, both 
reinforces and is reinforced by the doctrine of shareholder primacy, 
and has become so entrenched in modern thinking about corporations 
that it bears no mention in corporate law scholarship. 
Over the years, this basic structure and the exclusive shareholder 
franchise has been propped up by several different arguments, 
including, most notably, the argument from the residual and the 
argument from Arrow’s theorem.  But over the past decade, as those 
arguments have fallen by the wayside, corporate law scholars have 
been forced to circle back to a final argument for the special voting 
status of shareholders—that this fundamental feature of corporate 
governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for 
agreements among all corporate constituents.  And because it reflects 
the preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, it should be 
viewed as the best way to structure the corporation. 
This argument, though, has always been a slippery one, drifting 
from reality to metaphor, bolstered by visions of hypothetical 
bargains that always seem to do a better job reflecting the views of 
particular groups of scholars than the desires of actual corporate 
constituents.  Does anyone really believe that workers think the best 
way to structure a corporation is to hand over the entirety of firm 
decision-making to shareholders?  The whole notion of the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts has been a theatrical production of dodges, 
feints, and posturing designed to rationalize and justify the existing 
order of things and used by corporate governance theorists to create 
the kind of rhetorical space they need to advocate for their own 
particular policy positions. 
The nexus of contracts theory, it turns out, is both descriptively 
wrong and normatively hollow, and as such provides a poor 
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foundation for the exclusive shareholder franchise.  The corporation 
is neither a contract nor a set of contracts.  Business organizations 
(including corporations) are state law entities that have their own 
legal personality and internal governance structure.  Reducing 
corporations to contractual components makes absolutely no 
theoretical sense, literally, metaphorically, or otherwise.  This final 
argument for shareholder voting, and shareholder primacy more 
generally, is built on a house of sand. 
It is time now to do the hard work of starting over and 
determining what the ideal structure or structures might be for 
organizations that bring together capital and labor in a process of 
joint production.  The modern corporation has, in fact, achieved 
amazingly powerful advances in technology and productivity.  At the 
same time, workers’ wages are stagnant, and the divide in income 
inequality grows ever wider.  Freed from the constraints of false 
theories, it is time to reconsider the possibilities for our economic 
organizations and the society that they help to shape. 
